Chapter I

Of the Origin and Design of Government in General, with Concise Remarks on the English Constitution

Common Sense by Thomas Paine
Published 1776

Some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher.

Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer. Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built upon the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him, out of two evils to choose the least. Wherefore, security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expense and greatest benefit, is preferable to all others.

In order to gain a clear idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest; they will then represent the beginning of society. In this state of natural liberty, society will be their first thought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto; the strength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the same. Four or five united would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of a wilderness, but one man might labor out the common period of life without accomplishing anything; when he had felled his timber he could not remove it—nor erect it after it was removed; hunger would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Disease, nay even misfortune, would be death; for though neither might be mortal, yet neither could be survived alone. Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our first laws, and the first rudiments of civil government take place, under the name of preservation of property.

It is not difficult to perceive that such a mode of government would be simple, and that some common interest regulated by mutual consent would be the principle of society and the law of the land. In this state, the reign of natural equality is preserved; the distinction of persons being lost in the equality of circumstances. But as the colony increases, public concerns will multiply, and the public interest will begin to demand a division of labor. This necessity will introduce the appointment of some to superintend the concerns of others, and of those some, perhaps, to direct the affairs of the whole. It is the absence of such regulation that makes society uncomfortable, and in which the want of government is immediately felt and lamented. Government in its infancy is a pure democracy, or the collective interest of the people; but as the colony increases, the public concerns will increase likewise, and the complexity of government will grow with the complexity of society.

Distinctions will arise, and the necessity of establishing some form of government will become evident. But as government grows more complex, so too does the danger of corruption. The more power concentrated in fewer hands, the greater the risk that it will be abused. Hence, the need for checks and balances, for frequent elections, and for the vigilance of the people.

Source: Public domain